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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1954 TERM
may appoint a clerk of the surrogate's court." This section is subject to Civil
Service Law section 22,14 which protects veterans in subordinate positions but does
not apply to officials filling independent positions.15
In finding that the clerk was an independent officer, the majority ignored an
earlier case which specifically found that the clerk of Surrogate's Court of Ontario
County was not an independent official.16 They reviewed the duties imposed on the
clerk by Surrogate's Court Act §32 and found that his powers, "to be exercised
concurrently with the surrogate," were to some extent the exercise of "some
portion of the sovereign power," and so not those of a subordinate employee.
In dissenting, Judge Dye pointed out that §32 begins with the words: "The
clerk and the deputy clerk of the surrogate's court may severally exercise, con-
currently with the surrogate, the following powers of the surrogate." In his
analysis of §32 he finds that the duties of the clerk are ministerial and are the
powers of the surrogate, not the clerk. The important administrative powers are
not statutory powers, which are essential to the status of an independent officer.
Mandamus
Because of budgetary limitations, the Fire Commissioner of New York City
made a practice of assigning fire captains to perform duties of battalion chiefs,
rather than fill the vacancies with permanent appointments. In a unanimous
opinion, the Court held, that the Commissioner was not authorized to compel fire
captains to perform duties of battalion chiefs for long periods of time without an
increase in pay and permanent appointment.17
The Fire Commissioner has the power to make temporary appointments,' 8
but the Civil Service Law spells out in great detail the situations permitting such
appointments,' and by implication situations not specifically authorized are
forbidden. Also, the statute expressly states that successive temporary appoint-
ments shall not be made to the same position. 0 The Court found that the instant
appointments were frequent and recurrent and constituted a pattern for filling the
position of battalion chief. Even if such action is not specifically barred by
statute, it violates the spirit of the Civil Service Law and shall not be permitted.
14. People ex rel. Hoefle v. Cahill, 188 N. Y. 489, 81 N. E. 453 (1907); Mercer
v. Dowd, 288 N. Y. 381, 384, 43 N. E. 2d 452, 453 (1942).
15. Mylod v. Graves, 274 N. Y. 381, 9 N. E. 2d 18 (1937).
16. Cappon v. Cleere, 177 Misc. 1027, 32 N. Y. S. 2d 845 (1942).
17. 0' Reilly v. Grumet, 308 N. Y. 351, 126 N. E. 2d 275 (1955).
18. N. Y. CIVIL SERVICE LAw §15; Regulations for the Uniformed Force of
the Fire Department of the City of New York §§2(1) (5), 3(1)(14), 35(3)(1); Civil
Service Commission Rule VIII (6) (1954).
19. N. Y. CIVIL SERVICE LAW §15.
20. Id. §15(3).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Since the appointment of eligible applicants to a position protected by Civil
Service involves the discretion of the appointing agency, the Court could not
order the Commissioner to appoint the captains to the position of battalion chief.21
However, this action was brought only to restrain him from exceeding his
authority; injunctive relief where the Civil Service Law is being violated is
properly sought in Article 78 proceedings.2 2
Review of Administration Determination
The Administrative Code of the City of New York provides that upon the
death of a member of that city's employees retirement system before his retirement,
and upon evidence submitted to the Board of Estimate of the city proving that
the death was the natural and proximate result of an accident sustained in the
course of employment, and not as a result of willful negligence on the part of an
employee, employee's dependents are are entitled to certain death benefits.23
The courts have decided that it is the duty of the Board of Estimate itself, in
the first instance, to pass on the sufficiency and quality of the evidence presented in
support of such a claim.2 4 The criterion on review of the Board's action is only
whether a rational basis for its conclusion can be found.25 Since the basis for
review by the courts is so narrow, all administrative agencies should conscientiously
and painstakingly assess evidence presented to them.28
In Kilgus v. Board of Estimate of City of New York,27 the court held, that
the Board of Estimate had not discharged its duty by accepting a report of a trial
committee, consisting solely of a non-elected employee of the Board, as the basis
of its decision. This report, together with conflicting testimony surrounding the
death for which claim was here made, was in the possession of the Board for some
months prior to its decision. Some members of the Board had stated that in the
absence of overwhelming evidence to the contrary they felt bound by the trial
committee's report; other members stated that the courts would later give the
claimant a full hearing if he chose to appeal. In the light of these statements, the
court felt that the Board misconceived its duty in not considering and making its
own independent findings and determinations of the facts before it.
The dissent strongly contended that since the report of the trial committee
21. Jaffe v. Board of Education, 265 N. Y. 160, 192, N. E. 185 (1934).
22. N. Y. Civ. PPAc. ACT §§1283-1306.
23. Administrative Code of the City of New York §B3-33. 0.
24. Daey v. Board of Estimate of the City of New York, 267 App. Dlv. 592,
49 N. Y. S. 2d 139 (2d Dep't 1944).
25. Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125, 146 (1939).
26. Weekes v. O'Connell, 304 N. Y. 259, 107 N. E. 2d 290 (1952).
27. 308 N. Y. 620, 127 N. E. 2d 705 (1955).
